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Abstract. First and foremost, this paper provides a short historical reminder of the emergence 
of the field of psychology of development of moral reasoning. In the second part of the paper, 
the author offers a problem-oriented overview of the field, that is, one possible classification 
of particular groups of problems for empirical research. This overview does not only point out 
to the problems that were more and that were less studied (e.g.. evaluative moral judgment 
and reasoning, distinguishing between moral and extra-moral rules and norms) and to those 
that were relatively neglected (i.e. understanding moral situations), but also to the problems 
that psychologists did not even recognise as research problems. Such are the problems of 
development of moral concepts, meaning of moral words etc. Finally, the author also points 
out to the fact that this classification could be taken as one way to define the field, that is, the 
way to determine the boundaries of its subject of studying.  
Key words: evaluative and non-evaluative moral reasoning, moral concepts, Piaget, Kohlberg, 
Turiel.  
Short historical overview of the field 
The history of psychological studying of the development of moral reaso-
ning is only somewhat shorter than the history of psychology as a science. 
However, although empirical studies of moral judgments and values appea-
red for the first time as early as in the last decade of the 19
th century (John-
son, 1962; Pittel & Mendelsohn, 1972), and although, what is more, their 
findings have been confirmed later in broad outline – still, the true begin-
ning of this field of developmental psychology will come only at the begin-
ning of the 1930s with the appearance of Piaget’s book “The Moral Judg-
ment of the Child” (Piaget, 1977/1932). There are several reasons justifying 
this historical judgment. First, earlier research was not backed up by a deve-
loped theory, and Piaget’s was. Second, besides theory, Piaget also offered a 
solid method. Third, the theory that we are talking about was not cut out 
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exclusively for the field of development of moral reasoning; on the contrary, 
the theory was originally shaped for a far wider field of intellectual develop-
ment (to say the least), and its author applied it himself this time and exami-
ned it in this particular field. Fourth, together with the theory, the findings 
served as a very strong inspiration for new and various research studies, and 
even more than that – for the new and methodologically and theoretically 
different research orientations. Piaget was an inspiration both for the fol-
lowers and for the “renegades”. It should be mentioned, indeed, that during 
the first twenty years or so since the publishing (in 1932), this work of Pia-
get attracted attention of an only insignificant number of researchers and 
that the true flourishing of research studies inspired by it occurs later, in the 
middle of the 1950s. However, in spite of that first period without response, 
this assessment does not lose anything of its credibility: the psychology of 
development of moral reasoning was grounded and born precisely by the 
early work of Jean Piaget. 
The first wave of research which, as it was said, commenced strongly 
in the middle of the 1950s and continued to develop strongly by the middle 
of the 1980s – is not sufficient, despite a large amount of papers and an of-
fered theoretical framework, to justify the conclusion that one field (or sub-
field) of developmental psychology emerged. Namely, that wave is compri-
sed of research that either only repeats Piaget’s (in new subpopulations, with 
somewhat changed methodology etc.) or, on the basis of the obtained fin-
dings, critically reflects on this or that individual claim of the original the-
ory. All this taken together gives us the right to say only that there is one 
theory of development of moral reasoning that is effective (which is being 
confirmed, tested or partially disputed in research). There is a theory of 
development of moral reasoning – Piaget’s – but there is still no field that is 
called “the psychology of development of moral reasoning”. And there is 
even less than that: in 90% of the cases, the wave we are talking about con-
sisted of research studies focused on only one of the topics from Piaget’s 
book – the topic of development of conception of responsibility (from objec-
tive to subjective), while other topics were either not tackled by research at 
all (for example, understanding of collective responsibility, conception of 
penal justice) or were researched rarely (such as conception of “positive” or 
distributive justice, see Damon, 1975; Nisan, 1984; McGillicaddy-DeLisi, 
1994; understanding of justice as immanent, see Najarian-Svajian 1966). In 
other words: in comparison with Piaget’s book, where we find one theory 
and wider scope of problems (topics) that were studied, the first wave of pa-
pers, instead of expanding it, narrows down the scope of problems, thus 
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It was the work of Lawrence Kohlberg, although it also originated in 
the 1950s, that made the decisive step that marks the transition from a theory 
to a field (Kohlberg, 1963; Kolberg 1982). There are two main differences 
that separate the work of Kohlberg from that of Piaget: one is of methodo-
logical nature (instead of the method of stories in couples, he used the me-
thod of one story containing a moral dilemma), and the second one is theore-
tical (instead of two processes – moral heteronomy and autonomy – that 
alternate during the development, now we have the development in the form 
of six stages, that is, three levels). Someone might say that this difference is 
far too small and that it cannot justify the statement that the transition from 
the state with one theory to the state that already constitutes the field had 
occurred here: namely, Kohlberg’s theory did not step out of Piaget’s frame-
work. And that is correct. What is more, what Kohlberg did was to apply the 
general Piaget’s theory on the development of moral reasoning, and not to 
apply Piaget’s theory of moral development to the empirical material col-
lected by a different methodological procedure. In certain sense, Kohlberg 
has proved to be a bigger Piaget than Piaget himself in this field. 
However, although it seems insignificant, the change introduced by 
Kohlberg is still sufficient, in our opinion, to enable us to say how the tran-
sition from theory into field occurred. First, Kohlberg did not suppress and 
replace Piaget’s theory by his own work: for a long number of years both 
one and the other have been used in research parallel with one another. Se-
cond, with the addition of his part, the general theoretical framework has re-
mained the same (cognitive-developmental approach), but within that gene-
ral framework there are two separate methodological practices and two sepa-
rate theories used for explaining research findings. Even such a small plura-
lity of methods and theories is still enough to justify the statement that we 
no longer have one method and one theory – but that we have a field of re-
search and theory instead. 
Still, if some doubts still remain in this respect regarding the role of 
Kohlberg’s work in the emergence of the field (i.e. its transformation from 
state with one theory to state with full field status), they will completely disap-
pear less than a decade later, by the entrance of new theories, theoretical and 
methodological approaches. What should be mentioned first according to ti-
meline is Bandura’s theory of social learning (Bandura & McDonald, 1963; 
Bandura, 1969), and then attribution approach (Shaw & Sulzer, 1964; Fish-
bein & Ajzen, 1973; Harris, 1977; Fincham & Jaspars, 1979). Soon these were 
followed by the theory of information integration (Birnbaum, 1972; Surber, 
1977; Anderson & Butzin, 1978; Grueneich, 1982), the approach of Eliot Tu-
riel (Turiel, 1983), the theory of symbolic interactionism (Walton, 1985) etc. Psychology of development of moral reasoning 
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Problem of field and subfield 
And so, there is no dilemma now. The field of psychology of development 
of moral reasoning has existed for a number of decades already. In this field, 
there is not only one theory or only one model that is effective, even not 
only one approach (cognitive developmental); for researching individual 
phenomena in that field, different methods are used (although story method 
predominates), in it various theories are measured as competitive – etc. In a 
nutshell: we find a full plurality of theoretical approaches, theories, models 
and methods. Furthermore, what also occurred is a divergence of thematic 
(partly also theoretical) orientations, and then also the research of “female” 
morality, that is, the morality oriented towards care (Gilligan, 1977), of pro-
social moral reasoning (Eisenberg-Berg, 1979), whereby the dispersion of 
the field was further increased. 
What remains to us, however, is to provide answers to two questions 
before we continue. The first question refers to the wider field to which this 
(sub)field belongs, and the second is the question of its delimitation. 
For a long time now, in overview papers about the state of affairs in the 
fields of developmental psychology one can find the titles such as “Moral 
development” (see Hoffman, 1970; Turiel, 1998); in those, besides emotio-
nal and behavioural side of human morality, the cognitive side is shown as 
well, that is, the illustration of the situation in theory and research of the de-
velopment of moral judgment and reasoning. The same solutions will be 
found in textbooks of developmental psychology as well. Authors of those 
texts, obviously, classify that (sub)field into the wider field of psychology of 
moral development, and not into the wider field of psychology of cognitive 
development, and such a solution can be substantiated by the fact that hu-
man morality is one and unique psychological entity. On the other hand, real 
psychological studies that are performed almost never treat morality in that 
way, although, as a rule, they are followed by declarative statements in fa-
vour of the integrality of the phenomenon. What we want to say is that rese-
archers divided morality into aspects (cognitive, behavioural and emotional) 
and treat them separately. In brief, although it is completely logical that stu-
dies of development of moral reasoning enter the field of moral develop-
ment, the dominant features of the situation in research practice entitle us to 
classify this (sub)field into the psychology of cognitive development as well. 
That, however, does not imply that this field is clearly delimited by its 
scope of problems or by its precise and generally accepted definition of the 
basic phenomenon to which it owes its name (morality). On the contrary. It 
must be said that psychology of development of moral reasoning is not en-Jovan Mirić  278
closed, that it does not have its clear boundaries, that it (that is, its subject of 
studying) is not determined either by the classification of problem fields or 
by a generally accepted definition of both morality and moral reasoning. The 
latter was suggested and is suggested especially by the cognitive develop-
mental theorists such as Lawrence Kohlberg (subsuming moral under justi-
ce; see Colby and Kohlberg, 1987) or Eliot Turiel (emphasising that the 
whole philosophical thought considers justice and welfare central for mora-
lity; see Turiel, 1998: 903). Their suggestions, however, were not accepted, 
and so the unity and delimitation of the field have not been achieved by one 
generally accepted definition. On the other hand, nobody even tried to offer 
an inventory or classification of the problems. 
It would be better if the unity of the field were achieved by one good 
definition, which would also be theoretically neutral, but psychology is far 
from that – and, by all indications, even further and further – not only in this 
field of studying. Therefore, it seems that even that first solution (provided 
in the form of a well-laid out inventory of problems) would serve the pur-
pose well, and its advantage would be that it would provide an elaborated 
picture of the problem field stretching in front of the researchers. On top of 
that, the inventory of problems would be even more useful in the degree in 
which it would indicate not only the problems that were more and that were 
less studied, but also the problems that have been completely neglected or, 
even, not registered as problems; asking them explicitly would then also ser-
ve as an incentive for their empirical studying. Finally, one should also bear 
in mind the fact that until know, in our knowledge, this field has not been 
considered as a separate one, and therefore this paper has served its purpose 
even if it only encouraged thinking in this direction. 
In the remainder of this paper offers precisely that – an overview, in-
ventory (or classification) of the basic research problems (that is, groups of 
problems) that can serve to delimit the field that is called psychology of de-
velopment of moral reasoning. 
Overview of research problems 
The offered overview or classification is independent from the existing theo-
retical-methodological orientations in the field of developmental psycho-
logy, it is also independent from the fact how much and if at all certain 
classes are covered by the published empirical studies, and it also does not 
depend on the fact whether certain categories of research subjects make the 
same differences in their moral reasoning as in classification or do not (for 
example, it can be expected that evaluative moral reasoning of some sub-Psychology of development of moral reasoning 
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jects is so fused with non-evaluative that no clear difference between the 
one and the other can be perceived). Although this overview does not invol-
ve research results (that is, findings), we consider it to be of use either to 
those who want to obtain an initial insight into the problem field of psy-
chology of development of moral reasoning, or to those who decide to un-
dertake a certain research study of one of its narrower or wider problems. 
Finally, besides all that, it can be useful to those who are thinking of 
covering this field by systematic research on long-term basis.  
Moral reasoning can first be divided into two basic classes, in such a 
way that one consists of evaluative, and the other of non-evaluative moral 
reasoning.1 Psychology initially started to deal with evaluative moral reaso-
ning and it is today the most present field of research and theorising as well. 
Furthermore, when one says “moral reasoning”, it is most often referred pre-
cisely to evaluative. In brief, we are dealing with judgment (evaluation, 
valuing, estimation) and/or account of what is morally right or good (that is, 
not right or wrong), what is just or unjust. In this class of moral-psychologi-
cal problems, psychological science is mostly indebted to Jean Piaget (Pia-
get, 1977/1932) and Lawrence Kohlberg and his associates (Colby & Kohl-
berg, 1987). The most famous researchers of evaluative moral reasoning in 
Serbia are Popović and his associates (Popović & Miočinović, 1977), and 
Stojiljković (1998).  
The class of evaluative moral reasoning can further be divided accor-
ding to several different criteria. Let us take as a first example the “object of 
judgment”. According to that criterion, one subclass would be comprised of 
those objects that are linked with an individual (his/her actions, personality 
features, motives, feelings or a person as a whole), while the other one 
would be compounded of social groups as the object of judgment (for exam-
ple, nations, ethnic groups, professions etc.). The object of judgment for the 
largest number of psychological studies in this class were the actions of 
individuals (predominantly fictional characters in fictional stories), while we 
can say that other objects of judgment (not only social groups, but individual 
characteristics as well – motives, personality features, feelings etc.) have 
been highly neglected as far as research and theory work are concerned. 
The second criterion of classification of the problem of evaluative mo-
ral reasoning would consist simply of listing individual topics that it is pos-
                     
1 There are some reasons for the initial division into two classes to be performed differently: 
into thinking and meaning. Then the class of meaning would, naturally, also comprise concepts – or 
the whole problematics of meaning would in fact be reduced to moral concepts, that is, be subsu-
med under the development of moral concepts. This further leads to empirical attempts to examine 
one of the theories of concept development in the context of the concepts of this kind (which was 
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sible to find as subjects of discussion in philosophical literature for centuries 
now. In that way, the difference can be made between judgments about lie, 
promise, justice (commutative, penal and distributive), deceit, insult, supere-
rogation (actions beyond the call of duty), violence – etc. In all likelihood, 
that is also how Piaget acted when he commenced his work in this field 
(although his “list” of topic-subjects is narrowed down). Numerous prob-
lems out of those mentioned have remained not dealt with, and even some of 
those that were present in Piaget’s work. Such are the problems of penal 
justice and collective responsibility, for example.2 Finally, thematic division 
could be made in one more way, so that pro-social moral reasoning belongs 
to one group, with the remark that it is not completely clear how other 
groups would be determined (it is only certain that there are several of 
them). 
The second basic class consists of non-evaluative moral reasoning. 
What should be said right away is that this basic class, in comparison with 
the previously mentioned one, has been relatively neglected in psychological 
studies; several groups of problems belonging to this class have not drawn 
any attention until now, and it seems as though there is still no awareness of 
the existence of such problems either. 
In the lack of a more suitable way, the class of non-evaluative moral 
reasoning will be elaborated in such a way as to only provide the list of cer-
tain groups of problems, of course, committing ourself to the completeness 
of that list. Therefore, the class of non-evaluative moral reasoning is com-
prised of the following groups of topics or problems.  
• Distinguishing between moral and extra-moral field of judgment. So-
mewhere else (Mirić, 2001) this subgroup of problems has been named a 
classification moral judgment, and that referred to distinguishing between 
moral field (moral norms or rules) and conventions and personal field (see 
Miočinović, 1992). Empirical studies of these problems are relatively nume-
rous, mostly owing to Eliot Turiel3 and his associates (Smetana, 1981; Nuc-
ci & Nucci, 1982; Turiel, 1983; Yau & Smetana, 2003).  
• Moral concepts and their development form the second group of 
problems within this class. Unfortunately, it has to be said that so far there 
has been no empirical research devoted to moral concepts, let alone their 
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country (Vukmirović, 1997), and conception of penal justice in another one (Papić, 2004). 
3 Actually we should give credit to Eliot Turiel for this, because by starting to delimit the 
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that field, but instead turned towards providing the definition of morality (see also Turiel, 1983: 36-
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systematic studying. Some researchers dealt with the concept of lie along the 
way (Piaget, 1977/1932: 136-37; Wimmer, Gruber & Perner, 1984 and 
1985) – and that is all. This is an opportunity to mention here that several 
years ago, together with the students of the Department of Psychology of the 
Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade, we began trying out the possible ways of 
researching the development of moral concepts. Ten moral concepts (ho-
nour, theft, lie, dignity, honesty, robbery, slander etc.) were studied by the 
method of defining, and that attempt did not yield usable findings (primarily 
because it was not possible to single out with certainty all explicitly 
expressed semantic features in one definition). Story method proved out to 
be far more successful, for now only with the concept of lie. Those findings 
revealed a developmental sequence that, indeed, was not explained com-
pletely, but its first part takes place in this way: at youngest ages, children 
think that both things and plants and animals and people can lie (that is, the 
whole existing world can lie), then they reject the possibility of lying for 
things, and keep it for plants and everything else, then they reject plants, 
then animals, in order to finally leave people as the only subjects that the 
possibility of being able to lie is connected with (see Kostić, 2006).4 The 
development of the concept of lie does not stop there, but new studies are 
necessary in order to see which qualitative points are contained in a higher 
part of the sequence; for example, one point is made up of identification of a 
lie with a false statement (lie is still not understood as dishonesty, that is, it 
is yet not understood that one can lie by using a true statement as well), the 
highest point probably consists of the concept of lie placed in conceptual 
system (which assumes distinguishing between a lie and a deceit, unfulfilled 
promise etc.) 
• It is possible to classify in this class of problems even some concepts 
that have drawn a large amount of attention of researchers of various orien-
tations; what it is referred to in the first place is the concept of responsi-
bility, which was the subject of studying of not only Piaget and his follo-
wers, but attribution theorists as well. We still think that it is justified to 
speak about a separate group of problems – let us call it inframoral field – 
because besides responsibility (objective and subjective, individual and 
collective) it is also possible to include here the conceptualisation of fre-
edom and free will, which was something that did not attract the attention of 
researchers. 
                     
4 Construction of the sequence that was tested on data roughly corresponds to Vygotsky’s theo-
ry of conceptual development, with the remark that we bore in mind that moral concepts are cha-
racteristic (inseparable from the subject, because of which, namely, the stage of syncretism had to 
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• The problem of meaning of moral words and judgments (we are pri-
marily referring to the words “good” and “bad” in moral judgment), the cen-
tral problem of meta-ethics, did not draw any attention on the part of psy-
chologists – researchers. What should indeed be mentioned is that Piaget’s 
concept of moral realism points out to this problem and so does the concept 
of reification, introduced by one of the critics of Turiel’s theoretical as-
sumptions (Gabenneich, 1990). However, at present, it can be said not only 
that the problem was not even seriously set up in front of researchers, but 
also that it is not even possible to discern the method for its systematic rese-
arch on different levels of complexity of moral reasoning (that is, judgment, 
tenet, normative-ethical conception etc.). Unlike psychologists, in arguing 
certain meta-ethical problems philosophers sometimes appeal to the so-cal-
led ordinary moral awareness, referring by that to the kind of meaning at-
tributed to moral words by laymen (see Stojanović, 1971). Of course that it 
would be better for them if they could be backed by conducted empirical 
studies – which should be performed by psychologists. Let us just state se-
veral individual questions related to the problem of meaning. Relying on the 
findings from other fields of intellectual development, it can be assumed 
that in the beginning of the development moral words are understood as 
though they had a descriptive meaning (cognitive) and that it were compre-
hensive, and even wider from what Piaget encompassed by the concept of 
moral realism. However, we do not even know when one overcomes des-
criptivism, whether it remains in some segments longer than in others, is it 
present in adults5 – etc.  
• Understanding moral rules and norms and their differentiation from 
simpler “units” such as prohibitions and commands on the one hand, and on 
the other, from more complex ones such as principles, supreme laws and 
values. This problem, a very big one for developmental psychology of moral 
has also not been subjected to systematic empirical research. At which age it 
is possible to exactly understand the Golden rule, how Kant’s categorical 
imperative is understood, how implications of utilitarian supreme measure 
of utmost happiness are understood, how moral values are conceptualised – 
those are only some of the individual questions from this subgroup. 
• Understanding, that is, defining the situation which causes problems 
for evaluative moral judgment. Respondents do not define equally the situa-
tions in stories that are used for studying evaluative moral reasoning (for 
                     
5 It can be said with certainty that one does not completely overcome descriptivism with 
growing up. Therefore, for example, a fellow passenger in the bus says for himself “I am a good 
man!”, whereby he bases that statement on the assessments of several mutual acquaintances, ap-
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example, the one in the story “Heinz” from Kohlberg’s instrument). The 
only thing we came across in literature on the subject is the mentioning of 
the research that found a positive correlation between the definition of the 
situation (in the stories from Kohlberg’s instrument) and the level of 
development of evaluative moral reasoning (see Walker, 1986). Besides, 
researchers did endeavour to find out something about the understanding of 
the situation through estimations of putting oneself in somebody else’s 
position (most often the position of the harmed or damaged party, see Dunn, 
Brown & Maguire, 1995), but putting oneself in somebody else’s position 
(role taking) is not the same as understanding the whole situation. However, 
everyday experience tells us about the importance of this problem, either 
when we are dealing with simple situations (where an individual faces an 
ordinary temptation, that is, the choice between a clear moral rule and sel-
fish desire) or with complex (where two moral rules or two values are con-
fronted): on one occasion we can see that the simplest moral feeling does 
not exist, the second time we see that concepts are lacking, the third time 
both one and the other – and all that remains for new researchers to find out. 
It should be mentioned that Rest (1984) is the one who was aware of the 
problem (see also Miočinović, 1988: 125-132; 2004: 116-119; Stojiljković, 
1998: 81-87). 
• The problem of consistence. Ordinary experience tells us that most 
often one can perceive more than one tenet that people use in their moral 
judgments (inconsistence), as well as that, not rarely, when applied to actual 
situations, principles that have been somewhat earlier emphasised as their 
own are violated (inconsistence). It is difficult to find a man who is consis-
tently a retributivist or utilitarian when judging about punishment, and even 
criminal codes are not more consistent: what we can read in them are also 
utilitarian justifications and specific retributivism in deciding about the ratio 
between the offence and the severity of the punishment. Once this problem 
is transferred into the developmental perspective, it most definitely gets 
more complex in more than one way. It is difficult, especially at earlier ages, 
to expect either consistence or inconsistence at the level of the most general 
supreme criteria, in the same way in which it is also difficult to expect the 
awareness of inconsistence, simply because those criteria are still cogniti-
vely unavailable. The question of consistence-inconsistence can therefore be 
asked at the level of more simple, content-defined and less general criteria. 
However, what is important for the field of psychology of development of 
moral reasoning is not only the problem of consistence, but, even more, the 
problem of awareness of (in)consistence. Is it even necessary to mention that 
this problem did not find its researchers either? Jovan Mirić  284
After this overview of problem field of psychology of development of 
moral reasoning, it is possible to point out to an abundance of new questions 
that might open up and lie dormant for now “below the threshold of 
consciousness”. However, at this place, we would only like to point out to 
one such new question that remained not dealt with and that would be raised 
only if we started to study the now neglected phenomena. 
Namely, the existing studies of evaluative moral reasoning use story 
technique, as it has already been said. The examples of moral actions descri-
bed in stories are always such that they remain clearly within the boundaries 
of concepts that comprise those actions: at all ages the action of lying will 
be understood as a lie, the described action of promising as a promise, etc. 
However, as far as content is concerned, it is possible to describe the action 
of lying in the story in such a way to make it step outside the boundaries of 
conceptualisation (concept) at the given age or age range (for example, to 
describe the action of lying as pronouncing a true statement) and administer 
it in the procedure of studying the evaluative moral reasoning itself (regard-
less of whether it would be a part of one confrontation story or of stories in 
couples). Are the findings about evaluative judgment, familiar from studies 
made so far, going to be called into question or not in this case as well? We 
believe they will. Anyhow, it is only one “dark spot” that we can arrive at by 
a simple crossing of evaluative and non-evaluative aspect of moral reaso-
ning in development. 
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Јован Мирић 
ПСИХОЛОГИЈА РАЗВОЈА МОРАЛНОГ МИШЉЕЊА:  
ПРОБЛЕМСКИ ПРЕГЛЕД ОБЛАСТИ 
Апстракт 
У овом раду најпре се даје кратак историјски подсетник о настанку области 
психологије развоја моралног мишљења. У другом делу рада аутор нуди про-
блемски преглед области, односно једну могућу класификацију посебних група 
проблема за емпиријска истраживања. У томе прегледу не указује се само на 
проблеме који су више и који су мање истраживани (напр. евалуативно морал-
но суђење и мишљење, разликовање моралних од ванморалних правила и нор-
ми), те који су релативно запостављени (напр. схватање моралне ситуације), 
него се указује и на проблеме које психолози чак нису ни препознали као про-
блеме за истраживање. Такви су проблеми развоја моралних појмова, значења 
моралних речи итд. Најзад, аутор указује и на то да би ова класификација мог-
ла да се узме и као један начин дефинисања области, односно начин одређива-
ња граница њеног предмета проучавања. 
Кључне речи: вредносно и невредносно морално мишљење, морални појмови, 
Пијаже, Колберг, Туриел.  
 
Йован Мирич 
ПСИХОЛОГИЯ РАЗВИТИЯ НРАВСТВЕННОГО МЫШЛЕНИЯ: 
ПРОБЛЕММНЫЙ ОБЗОР ОБЛАСТИ 
Резюме 
В статье сначала излагается краткий очерк становления области психологии 
развития нравственного мышления. Во второй части статьи автор предлагает Psychology of development of moral reasoning 
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проблеммный обзор данной области, в частности одну из возможных класси-
фикаций отдельных групп проблем для эмпирических исследований. В этом 
обзоре указывается не только на проблемы, которые более или менее изучены 
(например,  эвалюативное  нравственное  суждение  и  мышление,  различение 
нравственных и вненравственных правил и норм), или на проблемы, которые 
до сих пор слабо разрабатывались (например, понятие о нравственной ситуа-
ции), но и на те проблемы, которые психологами даже не были выявлены в ка-
честве объектов исследования. Таковыми являются проблемы развития нравс-
твенных понятий, значения нравственных слов и т. п. Автор указывает и на то, 
что данная классификация может послужить и в качестве инструмента опреде-
ления данной области, т. е. способа определения пределов предмета изучения. 
Ключевые  слова: ценностное и неценностное нравственное мышление, нрав-
ственные понятия, Пиаже, Кольберг, Туриель. 
 
 